Jonathan Morduch

Jonathan Morduch has taught at NYU since 2000, where he is a Professor of Public Policy and Economics. He focuses on finance and development. His co-authored 2005 book, The Economics of Microfinance (MIT Press), develops a policy-focused research agenda, and is described by Thomas Easton of The Economist as: “The single best book on the economics of banking and finance, period…” He is also the co-author of the ground-breaking book, Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s Poor Live on $2 a Day (Princeton University Press).

Morduch’s ongoing work on social investment, financed by the Ford Foundation applies insights from the modern theory of corporate finance to develop new understandings of the limits and possibilities of markets and philanthropy. Morduch is currently chair of the United Nations Committee on Poverty Statistics, advises Pro Mujer, and is a member of SafeSave in Dhaka. He is a member of the Editorial Board of the World Bank Economic Review and of the UN Advisors Group on Inclusive Financial Sectors. His views on finance and development have been reported by the New York Times, The New Yorker, CNN, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, Associated Press, and other organizations. He holds a BA from Brown and Ph.D. from Harvard, both in Economics. In January 2009 Morduch was awarded a Doctorate Honoris Causa from the Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

So how exactly do we regulate microfinance?

by Jonathan Morduch: Friday, July 9, 2010

Jonathan Morduch, a guest blogger for the Microfinance Blog, is sharing his thoughts about regulating microfinance.

That is indeed the question when regulators so often find themselves playing catch up – trying to figure out if and how something that’s already happening should be supervised.

When it comes to prudential regulation – or safeguarding deposits – the stakes are particularly high. In microfinance, most MFIs aren’t big enough to threaten the health of the financial systems they’re part of if they run into trouble. However, if prudential regulation of microfinance is inadequate – or when it fails – poor customers stand to lose their savings entirely. And the stakes really don’t get much higher than that.

As with other forms of regulation, the basic dilemma is that regulators of microfinance want to ensure the health of financial institutions without creating undue burdens on the institutions, or on themselves. Striking the balance is tricky when experience with regulating financial access and evidence to support hypothetical costs and benefits are so thin.

In his third Policy Framing Note for the Financial Access Initiative, David Porteous sheds some light on why these challenges are so, well, challenging, and describes early experiences with prudential regulation of microfinance in India, Nigeria, the Philippines and Nigeria.

According to the paper, there are two basic ways to integrate microfinance into regulatory frameworks. One is to amend existing regulations; the other is to write new laws that open special “windows” for microfinance. The window approach is appealing, since microfinance is a rather unique animal in the world of financial services. But, as CGAP points out in its 2003 “good practice” guidelines, for the sake of consistency and efficiency, financial regulation really works best when it focuses on activities or functions, not on types of institutions.

In the end, there’s no such thing as off-the-rack regulatory policy, and amending existing regulation to incorporate microfinance just isn’t always doable. Some activities, like mobile banking, are so distinct they simply demand their own sets of rules. What’s more, regulation should always be considered on a country-by-country basis. But paying close attention to early experiences with prudential regulation of microfinance will certainly help policymakers start to make smart choices.

Consumer protection: when to protect, and how

by Jonathan Morduch: Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Jonathan Morduch, a guest blogger for the Microfinance Blog, is sharing his thoughts about consumer protection.

The 2008 global financial crisis intensified conversations about consumer protection. The financial crisis showed us that overly-liberalized credit markets can lead to overlending by institutions and heavy debt burdens for borrowers.  Not surprisingly, the buzz these days is about “responsible banking.”

But self-regulation may not be enough—and may not be appropriate.  After all, these are the same banks and institutions that created the original problems.  Regulators are thus determining their next steps.

There are always trade-offs in designing regulations, though, and this isn’t the obvious time to be adding extra burdens for already-burdened regulators.  Nor is it clear that imposing extra costs on financial institutions won’t affect their ability to serve poorer and under-served communities.  Our evidence to date suggests the opposite.

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The Regulator’s Dilemma: Navigating Competition Policy

by Jonathan Morduch: Thursday, February 11, 2010

There’s a lot of debate about how best to regulate microfinance. Regulators face the tricky job of safeguarding the stability of the financial sector while simultaneously providing flexibility for institutions focused on the unbanked. Global evidence shows that even well-intentioned regulation and supervision can hamper the ability of institutions to reach poorer populations.

We don’t need more “best practices”. We need ways to think about tough and imperfect tradeoffs. At the Financial Access Initiative, we’ve been wrestling with how best to help policymakers navigate these decisions. We turned to regulatory expert David Porteous to lead the effort. In a new series of Policy Framing Notes, he sums up the tradeoffs that policymakers face, outlining the “regulator’s dilemma”.

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